Is the Sex Discrimination Rationale in the SSM Cases Narrower?
by Michael Dorf During Part 1 of Tuesday's oral argument in the SSM cases , CJ Roberts created a stir when he asked the lawyer for the state the following question: "if Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom can't. And the difference is based upon their different sex. Why isn't that a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?" Writing in the NY Times , Adam Liptak suggested that the Chief Justice's question hinted at a possible narrower ground on which he might join the presumed five other votes for a right to SSM. Stating what has become more or less the emerging conventional wisdom, Liptak wrote that CJ Roberts "may have found a modest path that would not require revision of constitutional standards for discrimination based on sexual orientation." I have long agreed with the argument that laws banning SSM are unconstitutional under the equal protection rationale of Loving v. Virginia for exactly the reason articul