Justice Thomas Uncharitably Characterizes His Own Opinion in Brand X
by Michael C. Dorf On Wednesday I explained why Justice Thomas is wrong in arguing, as he did in his dissent from denial of certiorari in Baldwin v. United States on Monday, that Chevron deference to administrative agencies is unconstitutional. His argument, I explained, relies on an unnecessarily maximalist understanding of Chevron , seeing that case as mandating judicial abdication of the authority to construe the law in favor of administrative interpretation rather than as simply a presumption of statutory interpretation according to which congressional use of vague or ambiguous language in agency-empowering statutes acts as a delegation of policy-making discretion to agencies. Today I want to focus on Justice Thomas's further argument (in part II of his Baldwin dissent) that even accepting Chevron , his own majority opinion in the Brand X case should be overruled. He writes: "By requiring courts to overrule their own precedent simply because an agency later adopts